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Location-Based Mobile Services (LBMS) is rapidly 
gaining ground and becoming increasingly popular, 
because of the variety of efficient and personalized 
services it offers. However, if users are not guaranteed 
their privacy and there is no assurance of genuineness 
of server's response, the use of these services would be 
rendered useless and could deter its growth in mobile 
computing. This paper aims to provide confidentiality 
and integrity for communication that occurs between 
users and location service providers. A practical sys-
tem that guarantees a user's privacy and integrity of 
server's response, using a cryptographic scheme with 
no trusted intermediary, is provided. This scheme also 
employs the use of symmetric and asymmetric en-
cryption algorithms to ensure secure message and key 
transfer. In order to overcome the problem of compu-
tational complexities with these algorithms, AES-256 
is used to encrypt the message and user's location. 
Several researches have been done in this category 
but there is still no system that checks the integrity 
of server's response. The proposed scheme is resistant 
to a range of susceptible attacks, because it provides 
a detailed security analysis and, when compared with 
related work, shows that it can actually guarantee pri-
vacy and integrity with faster average response time 
and higher throughput in LBMS.
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: Security and privacy 
→ Security services → Privacy-preserving protocols
Keywords: cryptography, message authentication, in-
tegrity
1. Introduction
Location-Based Mobile Service (LBMS) has 
become one of the most widely used mobile 
applications because of the high demand in the 
use of mobile phones (Yoon et al. [1], Kasamani 
and Gikundi [2]). The future gets closer to us 
with location-based services (LBS) taking into 
account location information of the user, avail-
able anywhere and anytime. Location is a basic 
factor that determines the means by which peo-
ple interact and get things done in their envi-
ronment.
Location based services, as defined by Schil-
ler and Voisard [3], are ''services that integrate 
a mobile device's location or position with 
other information so as to provide added val-
ue to a user''. In a broad perspective, Xu and 
Gupta [4], described LBMS as network-based 
services with the aim of providing added val-
ue to the user by using mobile user's location 
with other information. The delivery mecha-
nisms used for LBMS include mobile internet, 
mobile applications, Short Message Service 
(SMS) text messaging, Multimedia Messaging 
Service (MMS), services using GPS, indoor 
location services, digital out of home, digital 
signage, print media and television (Khan and 
Light [5]). Location privacy is of outmost im-
portance since location service providers use 
clients' location information to offer them con-
venient and useful services. However, if users 
of such services are not assured that their priva-
cy is guaranteed and will not be breached, they 
may opt-out of such service or even oppose its 
implementation (Popa et al. [6], Eckhoff and 
Wagner [7]). A lot of research has been con-
ducted concerning how to enjoy location-based 
services while protecting the location priva-
cy of the mobile users (Memon [8], Kim [9], 
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2.4. RSA Signature Scheme
The RSA signature scheme is based on RSA 
encryption and it has become the most popular 
digital signature scheme amidst its contempo-
raries. Its security is based on the integer fac-
torization. Just as the handwritten signature is 
used to authenticate the sender of a message, 
the digital signature is used for similar purpose, 
but it offers more functions as an encryption 
method. It offers security protection for digital 
transactions. The private key is used to append 
signature on a document by the sender of the 
message, while the corresponding public key is 
used by the recipient of the message to verify 
the signature in order to check if the message is 
from the right source.
2.5. Advanced Encryption Standard  
(AES-256)
AES-256, a standard secret-key encryption al-
gorithm, was employed in this paper to encrypt 
the actual message and location coordinates 
before transmission to the receiver, because it 
is generally designed to be highly resistant to a 
cryptanalysis attack. AES-256 uses the largest 
key size out of the three different versions avail-
able (i.e., AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256) 
and has been chosen for implementation since 
it is more secure than the other two versions. 
However, any other symmetric encryption or 
hashing algorithm can be used as security of the 
proposed scheme, as it does not totally depend 
on the secret-key algorithm employed.
2.6. Related Work
Sweeney [21] introduced k-anonymity as a 
property by which a user is indistinguishable 
from other (k -1) users, if attempts are made to 
transmission. RSA stands for Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir and Leonard Adleman (Rivest-Sham-
ir-Adleman) who were the first people to pro-
pose the scheme in 1977 and it is based on 
a one-way function of integer factorization 
scheme. 
RSA consists of three fundamental phases: the 
key generation phase, encryption phase and 
decryption phase. The key generation phase is 
where the public/private key pair (e, d) of each 
user is generated, (e, d) are computed in mod-
ulus n and used to encrypt and decrypt data as 
required. The security of RSA relies on the dif-
ficulty of solving the integer factorization prob-
lem, i.e., given n and e, it is difficult to compute 
d if prime integers P and Q are extremely large. 
RSA uses the longest key length, as compared 
to discrete logarithm and Elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems. Since they require arithmetics with 
very long operands and keys, this implies that 
the longer the operands and keys, the more se-
cure the algorithms become.
Thus, the main use of the encryption feature in 
a public-key algorithm like the RSA is to se-
curely perform key exchange for a symmetric 
cipher. In practical sense, RSA is often used 
together with symmetric cipher like the AES, 
where it (RSA) does the key transport, and the 
symmetric cipher does the actual bulk data en-
cryption. It is important to note that the Euler's 
phi function plays an important role in RSA 
cryptosystem. Just like with the RSA scheme, 
the security of RSA Digital Signature Scheme 
also relies on integer factorization.
2.3. Euler's Phi Function
The Euler's phi function is a very useful tool 
in asymmetric cryptosystems, specifically for 
RSA. Given a set of integers as in (1):
Zn = {0, 1, ..., n - 1}.                 (1)
Therefore, Euler's phi function is defined as 
''the number of integers in Zn relatively prime 
to n is denoted by ϕ(n)''. However, computing 
Euler's phi function with large number is not 
a thorough method for large numbers in asym-
metric cryptosystem. A better approach is fac-
toring n, given in (2).
Sun et al. [10], Shen et al. [11], Gardner et al. 
[12]). For example, for a given LBS user who 
wants to find the nearest bank to him, sending 
his present location may put his privacy at risk. 
To secure his privacy, he hides his present lo-
cation and his identity as the person sending 
query to the service provider. The simplest way 
to achieve this is to remove his identity in ex-
change for a pseudonym which is sent to the 
service provider, but it is not enough to pre-
serve the user's privacy, since his/her identity 
can be unveiled through a quasi-identifier (Sa-
marati and Sweeney [13]).
In most instances, many mobile device users 
will refuse to use devices that are GPS enabled 
or will switch it off, even if it is installed on 
their mobile devices for fear of a breach of lo-
cation privacy. Another instance is when drivers 
switch off the transponders in their vehicles for 
fear of attack on online database that are usually 
tampered with or misused by passive attackers 
who have detailed movement of users and can 
attempt criminal attacks such as burglarizing 
homes when they are sure residents are away 
Weber [14].
Location privacy concerns are the issues that 
should be tackled on daily basis because con-
tinual advancement in location services has 
opened the possibility of breach in users priva-
cy, causing them to opt out of such services or 
even oppose to their use (Olumofin et al. [15], 
Olumofin and Goldberg [16], Popa et al. [17], 
Arain et al. [18]).
Introducing a combined concept of location pri-
vacy, message authentication and integrity of 
a server result using cryptographic approach-
es to develop a Location-Based Client-Server 
service satisfying the aforementioned require-
ments is thus the main motivation for our re-
search.
In this paper, a Location-Based Service for 
enhancing Privacy and Integrity (LBS_PI) is 
designed. The designed location-based applica-
tion for mobile users does not require a trust-
ed third party and guarantees location privacy 
protection of users while maintaining practical 
functionality and benefits of such services. This 
paper also provides self-verifiable information 
by the LBS server.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Overview of Cryptographic Methods
Cryptography is a very strong tool for protecting 
the data and information transfer. Cryptography 
lays a foundation of many security frameworks 
and forms the backbone of encryption and de-
cryption processes. Cryptography is divided 
into three branches; asymmetric, symmetric and 
hashing schemes. All these branches entail en-
cryption and decryption processes. Encryption 
is a cryptographic method that converts infor-
mation from a plain text (readable) into unintel-
ligible (non-readable) form, to avoid access by 
unauthorized entities. Encryption assures integ-
rity, authenticity, privacy, access control and so 
on (Pradhan and Sharma [19]). 
Symmetric cryptographic schemes are also 
called single-key, secret-key, symmetric key 
schemes because a single key is used for both 
encryption and decryption processes. Sym-
metric schemes are generally faster, compared 
to asymmetric keys, and are used to establish 
session keys since it involves only a key (Paar 
and Pelzl, [20] ). The only challenge posed by 
symmetric schemes is the difficulty involved in 
having a secure key management that involves 
a large number of users. Examples of some 
symmetric schemes are DES, AES, MARS, 
Serpent, Twofish, Blowfish and RC6 etc.
On the other hand, asymmetric schemes make 
use of two separate keys, inverse of each other; 
they are called: the public key (used for encryp-
tion and known to everyone) and the private key 
(used for decryption and known only to the re-
ceiver). Asymmetric scheme has been designed 
to solve the key management problem encoun-
tered with symmetric schemes (Paar and Pelzl, 
[20]). It entails a lot of mathematical complex-
ities and, as such, is slower and not ideal for 
a large volume of data. Types of asymmetric 
schemes of practical importance are RSA, El-
Gamal and Elliptic Curve cryptosystems.
2.2. RSA Cryptosystems
RSA is one of the first practical public-key cryp-
tosystems and it is widely used to secure data 
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encountered in Ghinita [25] applying PIR pro-
tocol to location-based service content is very 
challenging. However, Ghinita's [25] work em-
ployed computational PIR protocol while Olu-
mofin et al. [15] used a higher version of PIR 
protocol (i.e. the symmetric PIR) which ensures 
database secrecy by abusive clients.
In a different perspective, Popa et al. [26] built 
a practical system called Vehicular Privacy 
(VPriv) that performs computational functions 
over paths travelled by drivers while preserv-
ing their identity. Its aim is to combine different 
cryptographic notions with engineering efforts 
to design new schemes and systems that are 
secure and practical. The use of cryptographic 
tools makes it difficult, if not impossible, for 
an attacker to decode. The drawbacks are: mod-
ern cryptographic protocols used are computa-
tionally intensive and the system is expensive 
to implement. Secondly, all clients that provide 
data must be online at the same time which 
makes it impractical in a very large population 
setting. Thirdly, the system lacks location pri-
vacy which makes it vulnerable to side infor-
mation attacks and lastly, the system does not 
guarantee integrity checks against a malicious 
server.
To combat location privacy problems such as 
side information attacks encountered in VPriv, 
Popa et al. [17] have built a practical system 
called Privacy Statistics (PrivStats) that per-
forms overall statistical computation of paths 
travelled by drivers while preserving their loca-
tion and identity privacy and has the application 
verifying whether drivers provide valid data. 
The approach used is based on standard cryp-
tographic techniques, i.e., RSA technique and 
theoretical protocols are transformed and im-
plemented on mobile devices and moving ve-
hicle for data publishing purpose. It guarantees 
stronger privacy in the face of side information 
and provides protection against abusive clients 
by allowing them to upload not more than re-
quired tuples to the server without a trusted 
party. Secondly, it is efficient on resource con-
strained devices and does not require all users to 
be online at the same time for it to work effec-
tively. The major drawbacks are: the addition of 
noise and junk records as a means to enhance 
privacy can impair the performance, consume 
storage and incur processing cost on the client's 
mobile device. Anonymizing network can de-
grade the quality of service. Lastly, the system 
is not self-verifiable (no integrity guarantees).
Recently, Pan et al. [27], proposed a new incre-
mental clique-based cloaking algorithm called 
ICliqueCloak, for defence against location de-
pendent attacks. The authors combined two pri-
vacy metrics. They are: location k-anonymity 
which protects user identity, but cannot protect 
location disclosure, and cloaking granularity 
which protects location disclosure, but cannot 
protect user identity. Both metrics employed 
serve as a complement of each other. Also, 
ICliqueCloak was designed to protect privacy 
against location-dependent attacks when us-
ers' locations are continuously updated as they 
move (unlinkability), as compared to exist-
ing k-anonymity location cloaking algorithms 
(Gong et al [28]) that are concerned with snap-
shot user location only (location privacy) and 
cannot combat attacks when users are in contin-
uous movement. Since the system is designed 
to handle multiple users, a trusted anonymizing 
proxy is needed to provide spatial and tempo-
ral cloaking functions. This single point of vul-
nerability makes it highly susceptible to attack 
if the anonymizing proxy is compromised and 
the anonymization cost is slightly increased. In 
ICliqueCloak, users cannot issue new request 
until the previous request has been serviced. 
In other words, users cannot issue more than a 
query at a time, which can degrade performance 
as a tradeoff for privacy. 
Li and Jung [29] proposed a fine-grained Priva-
cy-preserving Location Query Protocol (PLQP) 
that enables users to obtain location informa-
tion about other users without violating privacy 
(e.g., searching the proximity of a user's location 
from a querying user). The protocol comprises 
of many mobile users, but peers in the system 
are untrusted. The scheme preserves privacy by 
means of encrypting location information and it 
also guarantees access control (i.e., controls the 
rate at which users can learn about each other's 
location information). But the latter part is not 
within the scope of this work. Also, integrity 
checks are outside the scope of this work since 
it is not Client- Server architecture.
As an improvement on the work of Ghinita 
[25] and Olumofin et al. [15], Paulet et al. [30] 
proposed a protocol for location based queries 
by introducing two stage approaches based on 
identify a user. This forms the basis on which 
popular cloaking techniques are built. The ma-
jor limitation is that k-anonymity is not efficient 
in sparse populated area because it can reveal 
user location. Queries from multiple users 
are aggregated at the anonymity server which 
serves as an intermediary between the client 
and the server (often referred to as trusted third 
party).
Gruseter & Grunwald [22] developed a system 
model that protects identity and privacy of us-
ers. It consists of a trusted party server called an 
anonymizer, placed as an intermediary between 
the client and the server.
The anonymizer expands the exact user's loca-
tion into a cloaked region so that it contains the 
exact user location and other (k -1) users. This 
way, the server cannot distinguish the exact user 
from other (k -1) users. The anonymizer refines 
the candidate set and sends actual result to the 
user. It incurs low communication cost between 
client and anonymizer, but it has several disad-
vantages. First, the anonymizer becomes a per-
formance bottleneck because it needs to serve 
all its subscribed users and also maintain ac-
curate records of their location. Secondly, the 
anonymizer is prone to collusion from mali-
cious users since it represents the central point 
of attack. Thirdly, there are no integrity checks 
if the server has actually returned the correct 
result to client queries. Lastly, it is limited to 
privacy guarantees in areas of dense population 
and distribution of users.
Ghinita et al. [23] developed a location privacy 
model which runs on a client-server architec-
ture. The client uses PIR to encode the plain-
text message into an ''incomprehensible'' query. 
Then the server computes the encoded result 
blindly. The client derives the actual result from 
the encoded result sent by the server. This work 
is built on the computational PIR (cPIR) pro-
tocol introduced in Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky 
[24] where clients make use of PIR to query an 
LBS provider for nearby points of interest and 
which allows the client to retrieve a small frac-
tion of the LBS database that is cost effective. 
The system ensures message confidentiality, 
but no identity and location privacy guarantees. 
Also, the scheme is not self-verifiable (no in-
tegrity guarantees).
Ghinita et al. [23] approach was extended in 
Ghinita [25], where a user location is hidden 
inside a cloaked region and the PIR protocol 
is run between the client and the LBS provid-
er in order to disclose optimally small number 
of points-of-interest for database protection 
and also to reduce storage requirements on the 
user's mobile device. This approach provides 
strong location and identity privacy guarantees 
since the server is blinded and the weakest trust 
assumptions. Also, a message is kept confiden-
tial from passive attacker but it is very complex 
applying PIR protocols to LBS privacy because 
it entails finding effective methods of trans-
forming LBS queries that are content-based to 
PIR protocols that are index-based.
Similar to Ghinita's [25] work is the work by 
Olumofin et al. [15] who developed a hybrid 
scheme that can achieve efficient query privacy 
for location based services and is a trusted par-
ty free, algorithm that achieves a good compro-
mise between user location privacy and compu-
tational efficiency. Cloaking technique and PIR 
protocol have been combined to complement 
each other which guarantees strong location pri-
vacy, flexibility and scalability. The technique 
achieves strong location privacy in the sense 
that a user determines his or her privacy lev-
el, forms a cloaking region around his location 
and the area of interest and uses PIR protocol 
to query the database. An extension of PIR was 
used, i.e., the Symmetric PIR (sPIR) establishes 
database secrecy by assuring that no informa-
tion other than what is relevant to the current 
location is unveiled to the querying user, there-
by giving a stronger privacy protection to the 
server in the presence of a malicious client or 
attacker. The use of anonymizing network has 
not been supported because protecting user's 
location is superior to hiding user identity since 
an attacker can identify a user that has made a 
query from a certain geographical location. The 
major problem with this approach is low LBS 
server efficiency since the size of the cloaking 
region and its boundaries are controlled by the 
user and not by the server. Secondly, the size of 
the cloaking region should not be too small or 
too large in the sense that a small cloaking re-
gion implies that privacy can be easily breached 
while the larger region size makes the compu-
tation on the client's end more complex which 
can impair the performance. The same problem 
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and provides protection against abusive clients 
by allowing them to upload not more than re-
quired tuples to the server without a trusted 
party. Secondly, it is efficient on resource con-
strained devices and does not require all users to 
be online at the same time for it to work effec-
tively. The major drawbacks are: the addition of 
noise and junk records as a means to enhance 
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storage and incur processing cost on the client's 
mobile device. Anonymizing network can de-
grade the quality of service. Lastly, the system 
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Recently, Pan et al. [27], proposed a new incre-
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which protects location disclosure, but cannot 
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against location-dependent attacks when us-
ers' locations are continuously updated as they 
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ing k-anonymity location cloaking algorithms 
(Gong et al [28]) that are concerned with snap-
shot user location only (location privacy) and 
cannot combat attacks when users are in contin-
uous movement. Since the system is designed 
to handle multiple users, a trusted anonymizing 
proxy is needed to provide spatial and tempo-
ral cloaking functions. This single point of vul-
nerability makes it highly susceptible to attack 
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ICliqueCloak, users cannot issue new request 
until the previous request has been serviced. 
In other words, users cannot issue more than a 
query at a time, which can degrade performance 
as a tradeoff for privacy. 
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cy-preserving Location Query Protocol (PLQP) 
that enables users to obtain location informa-
tion about other users without violating privacy 
(e.g., searching the proximity of a user's location 
from a querying user). The protocol comprises 
of many mobile users, but peers in the system 
are untrusted. The scheme preserves privacy by 
means of encrypting location information and it 
also guarantees access control (i.e., controls the 
rate at which users can learn about each other's 
location information). But the latter part is not 
within the scope of this work. Also, integrity 
checks are outside the scope of this work since 
it is not Client- Server architecture.
As an improvement on the work of Ghinita 
[25] and Olumofin et al. [15], Paulet et al. [30] 
proposed a protocol for location based queries 
by introducing two stage approaches based on 
identify a user. This forms the basis on which 
popular cloaking techniques are built. The ma-
jor limitation is that k-anonymity is not efficient 
in sparse populated area because it can reveal 
user location. Queries from multiple users 
are aggregated at the anonymity server which 
serves as an intermediary between the client 
and the server (often referred to as trusted third 
party).
Gruseter & Grunwald [22] developed a system 
model that protects identity and privacy of us-
ers. It consists of a trusted party server called an 
anonymizer, placed as an intermediary between 
the client and the server.
The anonymizer expands the exact user's loca-
tion into a cloaked region so that it contains the 
exact user location and other (k -1) users. This 
way, the server cannot distinguish the exact user 
from other (k -1) users. The anonymizer refines 
the candidate set and sends actual result to the 
user. It incurs low communication cost between 
client and anonymizer, but it has several disad-
vantages. First, the anonymizer becomes a per-
formance bottleneck because it needs to serve 
all its subscribed users and also maintain ac-
curate records of their location. Secondly, the 
anonymizer is prone to collusion from mali-
cious users since it represents the central point 
of attack. Thirdly, there are no integrity checks 
if the server has actually returned the correct 
result to client queries. Lastly, it is limited to 
privacy guarantees in areas of dense population 
and distribution of users.
Ghinita et al. [23] developed a location privacy 
model which runs on a client-server architec-
ture. The client uses PIR to encode the plain-
text message into an ''incomprehensible'' query. 
Then the server computes the encoded result 
blindly. The client derives the actual result from 
the encoded result sent by the server. This work 
is built on the computational PIR (cPIR) pro-
tocol introduced in Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky 
[24] where clients make use of PIR to query an 
LBS provider for nearby points of interest and 
which allows the client to retrieve a small frac-
tion of the LBS database that is cost effective. 
The system ensures message confidentiality, 
but no identity and location privacy guarantees. 
Also, the scheme is not self-verifiable (no in-
tegrity guarantees).
Ghinita et al. [23] approach was extended in 
Ghinita [25], where a user location is hidden 
inside a cloaked region and the PIR protocol 
is run between the client and the LBS provid-
er in order to disclose optimally small number 
of points-of-interest for database protection 
and also to reduce storage requirements on the 
user's mobile device. This approach provides 
strong location and identity privacy guarantees 
since the server is blinded and the weakest trust 
assumptions. Also, a message is kept confiden-
tial from passive attacker but it is very complex 
applying PIR protocols to LBS privacy because 
it entails finding effective methods of trans-
forming LBS queries that are content-based to 
PIR protocols that are index-based.
Similar to Ghinita's [25] work is the work by 
Olumofin et al. [15] who developed a hybrid 
scheme that can achieve efficient query privacy 
for location based services and is a trusted par-
ty free, algorithm that achieves a good compro-
mise between user location privacy and compu-
tational efficiency. Cloaking technique and PIR 
protocol have been combined to complement 
each other which guarantees strong location pri-
vacy, flexibility and scalability. The technique 
achieves strong location privacy in the sense 
that a user determines his or her privacy lev-
el, forms a cloaking region around his location 
and the area of interest and uses PIR protocol 
to query the database. An extension of PIR was 
used, i.e., the Symmetric PIR (sPIR) establishes 
database secrecy by assuring that no informa-
tion other than what is relevant to the current 
location is unveiled to the querying user, there-
by giving a stronger privacy protection to the 
server in the presence of a malicious client or 
attacker. The use of anonymizing network has 
not been supported because protecting user's 
location is superior to hiding user identity since 
an attacker can identify a user that has made a 
query from a certain geographical location. The 
major problem with this approach is low LBS 
server efficiency since the size of the cloaking 
region and its boundaries are controlled by the 
user and not by the server. Secondly, the size of 
the cloaking region should not be too small or 
too large in the sense that a small cloaking re-
gion implies that privacy can be easily breached 
while the larger region size makes the compu-
tation on the client's end more complex which 
can impair the performance. The same problem 
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sensitive location-based services. The authors 
expanded on previous works to enable symmet-
ric key exchange between connecting parties 
which can be used to securely share the location 
coordinates to compute the authentic remote-
ness of communicating parties. The authors 
claimed that their work preserves users location 
privacy but does not address a trusted third par-
ty scenario. Jannati and Bahrak [38] designed 
an oblivious transfer protocol based on Elgamal 
encryption for preserving location privacy. The 
authors suggested a better protocol for the pro-
tection of both client's location privacy and the 
server's database security, with negligible deg-
radation in the system performance, but failed 
to address a trusted third party scenario. Also, 
Solanas and Martínez-Ballesté [39] proposed 
privacy protection in location-based services 
through a public-key privacy homomorphism. 
The authors proposed a novel cryptosystem 
scheme for privacy of users of LBS assurance 
using a public-key infrastructure. The authors' 
scheme, unlike existing approaches, does not 
need any trusted third party to hide users' loca-
tion, but no attention was devoted to integrity 
and authenticity of server responses. Therefore, 
to solve the aforementioned gaps in literature, 
introduction of a combined concept of location 
privacy, message authentication and integrity 
of server results using cryptographic approach-
es is designed in this work.
3. Methodology
The scheme employed in this paper involves 
the use of symmetric encryption algorithm 
(AES-256), RSA cryptosystem, and RSA Digi-
tal Signature Scheme as basic tools.
With respect to the previously mentioned ba-
sic tools, a scheme that preserves privacy while 
enhancing integrity of server result is thus pro-
posed to solve the fundamental problems of 
information confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity of server responses. This scheme is 
coined from Location-Based Service for en-
hancing Privacy and Integrity (LBS_PI). The 
architecture of the proposed scheme is depicted 
in Figure 1.
3.1. Phases Involved in LBS_PI 
Architecture
The four phases involved in LBS-PI are:
 ● Client Registration Phase; 
 ● Client Request Generation Phase;
 ● Server Response Generation Phase;
 ● Client Response Retrieval Phase.
Oblivious Transfer Protocol and Private Infor-
mation Retrieval, to ensure privacy guarantees 
for both server and user. The system compris-
es a set of users, mobile service provider and 
location server. From the user's viewpoint, the 
mobile service provider and the location server 
are seen as a single server. From the server's 
viewpoint, the location server owns a set of 
POI records where each record describes POI 
giving GPS coordinates (x, y) and location de-
scription while the service provider establishes 
communication between the location server and 
the user and is not made to collude and reveal 
information about the user to the location serv-
er. The major edge this approach has over the 
previous work is that it provides stronger pri-
vacy guarantees for both clients and server and 
is more effective in terms of computation and 
communication overhead. The disadvantages 
are: firstly, the addition of dummies to user's 
records can distort data, thereby impairing per-
formance. Secondly, it is very complex to con-
vert PIR protocols that are index-based to loca-
tion-based queries that are content based. Since 
the server is blinded and a user's location is in 
a cloaked region, the response to user queries 
may not be accurate (no integrity checks).
Shokri et al. [31] proposed a user-collaborative 
privacy-preserving model (MobiCrowd) for lo-
cation services that does not rely on a central-
ized party, but instead, trust is distributed among 
mobile peers that form a network to achieve 
privacy. So, its performance depends on the 
network characteristics (e.g., time-dependent 
mobility), not just on what an individual device 
does. MobiCrowd employs the technique of 
hiding users (identity privacy guarantees) from 
the server and still allowing them to get query 
results from other peers. In essence, users can 
only contact the LBS server, but they cannot 
get the information required from other mobile 
peers thereby reducing the risk of location dis-
closure. Protocols can achieve higher fault tol-
erance since trust is evenly distributed among 
peers. The approach does not rely on a trust-
ed third party but privacy protection is placed 
with the users themselves. It also combats the 
Bayesian inference attack that allows attackers 
to have prior information before launching the 
attacks. The major drawbacks are: the approach 
entails higher communication and computa-
tional cost for resource-limited devices such as 
smart-phones, the system is prone to network 
congestion and it does not guarantee message 
confidentiality. 
Elghazal et al. [32] investigated the practical-
ities of LBS, and suggest a mobile application 
that has been developed to improve the effi-
cacy of smartphones by reducing the power 
consumption of Wi-Fi components using GSM 
cells ID information. The set-up of the pro-
posed application has showed a good saving in 
smartphone power consumption with the LBS 
concept. Garzon et al. [33] argue the technical 
and environmental factors that influence the 
reliability of proactive LBS. The authors in-
troduced an estimator with a proof-of-concept 
for the likelihood that a location-dependent 
action gets triggered by a proactive LBS. The 
outcome of comparing the estimator against an 
exemplary proactive LBS in the real world  has 
showed the validity of their concept. Sun et al. 
[34] presented labeled location to differentiate 
locations of mobile users to sensitive and or-
dinary locations. The authors designed a loca-
tion-label based (LLB) algorithm for protect-
ing location privacy of users while minimizing 
the response time for LBS requests. A perfor-
mance evaluation was conducted to authenti-
cate the accuracy of the proposed algorithm 
through extensive simulations. Chen et al. 
[35] proposed an efficient structure to shield 
user privacy. The designed structure utilizes 
redundant POI records to safeguard privacy 
against LBS provider, but uses a semi-trusted 
third party, called proxy, to filter out redundant 
POI records. To protect privacy against proxy, 
they designed a new filtering protocol, Blind 
filter, to allow the proxy to filter out redundant 
encrypted POI records in a blind way. Based 
on juxtaposition with similar solutions, their 
structure was found to be robust to dual identi-
ty attack, with reduced computation overhead. 
Memon et al. [36] proposed a scheme that can 
prevent users' private information and secure 
communication using asymmetric cryptog-
raphy. The authors claimed that the designed 
scheme was made robust against eavesdrop-
ping attack by providing mutual authentication 
using asymmetric cryptography scheme. The 
authors' work requires a trusted third party and 
does not guarantee location privacy protection 
of the users. Similarly, Kumar and Sunitha [37] 
designed a public key cryptosystem for privacy Figure 1. LBS_PI Architecture.
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expanded on previous works to enable symmet-
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which can be used to securely share the location 
coordinates to compute the authentic remote-
ness of communicating parties. The authors 
claimed that their work preserves users location 
privacy but does not address a trusted third par-
ty scenario. Jannati and Bahrak [38] designed 
an oblivious transfer protocol based on Elgamal 
encryption for preserving location privacy. The 
authors suggested a better protocol for the pro-
tection of both client's location privacy and the 
server's database security, with negligible deg-
radation in the system performance, but failed 
to address a trusted third party scenario. Also, 
Solanas and Martínez-Ballesté [39] proposed 
privacy protection in location-based services 
through a public-key privacy homomorphism. 
The authors proposed a novel cryptosystem 
scheme for privacy of users of LBS assurance 
using a public-key infrastructure. The authors' 
scheme, unlike existing approaches, does not 
need any trusted third party to hide users' loca-
tion, but no attention was devoted to integrity 
and authenticity of server responses. Therefore, 
to solve the aforementioned gaps in literature, 
introduction of a combined concept of location 
privacy, message authentication and integrity 
of server results using cryptographic approach-
es is designed in this work.
3. Methodology
The scheme employed in this paper involves 
the use of symmetric encryption algorithm 
(AES-256), RSA cryptosystem, and RSA Digi-
tal Signature Scheme as basic tools.
With respect to the previously mentioned ba-
sic tools, a scheme that preserves privacy while 
enhancing integrity of server result is thus pro-
posed to solve the fundamental problems of 
information confidentiality, integrity and au-
thenticity of server responses. This scheme is 
coined from Location-Based Service for en-
hancing Privacy and Integrity (LBS_PI). The 
architecture of the proposed scheme is depicted 
in Figure 1.
3.1. Phases Involved in LBS_PI 
Architecture
The four phases involved in LBS-PI are:
 ● Client Registration Phase; 
 ● Client Request Generation Phase;
 ● Server Response Generation Phase;
 ● Client Response Retrieval Phase.
Oblivious Transfer Protocol and Private Infor-
mation Retrieval, to ensure privacy guarantees 
for both server and user. The system compris-
es a set of users, mobile service provider and 
location server. From the user's viewpoint, the 
mobile service provider and the location server 
are seen as a single server. From the server's 
viewpoint, the location server owns a set of 
POI records where each record describes POI 
giving GPS coordinates (x, y) and location de-
scription while the service provider establishes 
communication between the location server and 
the user and is not made to collude and reveal 
information about the user to the location serv-
er. The major edge this approach has over the 
previous work is that it provides stronger pri-
vacy guarantees for both clients and server and 
is more effective in terms of computation and 
communication overhead. The disadvantages 
are: firstly, the addition of dummies to user's 
records can distort data, thereby impairing per-
formance. Secondly, it is very complex to con-
vert PIR protocols that are index-based to loca-
tion-based queries that are content based. Since 
the server is blinded and a user's location is in 
a cloaked region, the response to user queries 
may not be accurate (no integrity checks).
Shokri et al. [31] proposed a user-collaborative 
privacy-preserving model (MobiCrowd) for lo-
cation services that does not rely on a central-
ized party, but instead, trust is distributed among 
mobile peers that form a network to achieve 
privacy. So, its performance depends on the 
network characteristics (e.g., time-dependent 
mobility), not just on what an individual device 
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peers. The approach does not rely on a trust-
ed third party but privacy protection is placed 
with the users themselves. It also combats the 
Bayesian inference attack that allows attackers 
to have prior information before launching the 
attacks. The major drawbacks are: the approach 
entails higher communication and computa-
tional cost for resource-limited devices such as 
smart-phones, the system is prone to network 
congestion and it does not guarantee message 
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Elghazal et al. [32] investigated the practical-
ities of LBS, and suggest a mobile application 
that has been developed to improve the effi-
cacy of smartphones by reducing the power 
consumption of Wi-Fi components using GSM 
cells ID information. The set-up of the pro-
posed application has showed a good saving in 
smartphone power consumption with the LBS 
concept. Garzon et al. [33] argue the technical 
and environmental factors that influence the 
reliability of proactive LBS. The authors in-
troduced an estimator with a proof-of-concept 
for the likelihood that a location-dependent 
action gets triggered by a proactive LBS. The 
outcome of comparing the estimator against an 
exemplary proactive LBS in the real world  has 
showed the validity of their concept. Sun et al. 
[34] presented labeled location to differentiate 
locations of mobile users to sensitive and or-
dinary locations. The authors designed a loca-
tion-label based (LLB) algorithm for protect-
ing location privacy of users while minimizing 
the response time for LBS requests. A perfor-
mance evaluation was conducted to authenti-
cate the accuracy of the proposed algorithm 
through extensive simulations. Chen et al. 
[35] proposed an efficient structure to shield 
user privacy. The designed structure utilizes 
redundant POI records to safeguard privacy 
against LBS provider, but uses a semi-trusted 
third party, called proxy, to filter out redundant 
POI records. To protect privacy against proxy, 
they designed a new filtering protocol, Blind 
filter, to allow the proxy to filter out redundant 
encrypted POI records in a blind way. Based 
on juxtaposition with similar solutions, their 
structure was found to be robust to dual identi-
ty attack, with reduced computation overhead. 
Memon et al. [36] proposed a scheme that can 
prevent users' private information and secure 
communication using asymmetric cryptog-
raphy. The authors claimed that the designed 
scheme was made robust against eavesdrop-
ping attack by providing mutual authentication 
using asymmetric cryptography scheme. The 
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does not guarantee location privacy protection 
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3.1.3. Server Response Generation Phase
In this phase, server S decrypts the encrypted 
request, searches its database for the POI that 
matches the request, encrypts the response and 
digitally signs with its private key on the left-
most bit of its symmetric key. Server S sends 
(Crs, Cks, DSig) to the client.
The server receives the encrypted signal from 
ui in the form (CLui, Cmui, Ckui). Server runs the 
Server Asymmetric Decryption (SAD) algo-
rithm which accepts (CLui, Cmui, Ckui) and its pri-
vate keys (ds, ns) as the input to retrieve Session 
key kui. The server computes the following:
Decryption module:
Step 1: Server S decrypts Ckui with (ds, ns) to 
give kui as:
Dds(Ckui) → Ckuids mod ns = kui
After the session key has been re-
trieved in plaintext kui, it is used to 
compute the ciphertext location coor-
dinates and message to plaintext Lui, 
mui .
Step 2: Server S runs Server Symmetric De-
cryption (SSD) algorithm on CLui us-
ing AES 256 with the session key kui 
as:
Dkui(CLui) = Lui.
Step 3: Server S runs Server Symmetric De-
cryption (SSD) algorithm on Cmui us-
ing AES 256 with the session key kui 
as:
Dkui(Cmui) = mui.
S searches its plaintext database for a matching 
response (in terms of POIs) to mui. The response 
rs must be related to the location coordinates Lui 
indicating the position of ui.
Encryption module. Before S sends response 
rs to ui, it does the following:
(i) Server S chooses an integer as the session 
key ks to perform response transfer to the 
user.
(ii) Server S runs Server Symmetric Encryp-
tion (SSE) algorithm. The algorithm al-
lows S supply the response rs, and session 
key ks that will be used to perform the en-
cryption process.
(iii) Server S encrypts rs with ks as Crs (cipher-
text of the server's response) using the 
AES-256 algorithm.
(iv) Server S then encrypts its session key ks 
with ui public key (eui, nui) by running the 
Server Asymmetric Encryption (SAE) al-
gorithm. The RSA algorithm is used to en-
crypt session key ks. 
The steps are outlined, as follows. 
Step 1: Server S selects an integer as session 
Key ks.
Step 2: Server S encrypts rs to Crs with ks us-
ing AES-256 as:  
Eks(rs) = Crs.
Step 3: Server S encrypts ks with (eui, nui) us-
ing RSA to give Cks as:
Eeui(ks) → kseui mod nui = Crs.
Digital signature module. The RSA Digital 
Signature Scheme (RSA-DSS) is employed by 
the server S to sign on the response rs before 
sending to ui. The aim of employing digital sig-
nature scheme, as mentioned earlier, is to guar-
antee the sender of the response rs, is genuine, rs 
is correct and the message has not been altered 
in transit. The steps are outlined, as follows.
Step 1: Server S selects the leftmost bit of Cks 
where Cks = {1....9}
Step 2: Server S signs on the leftmost bit of 
Cks with its private key (ds, ns) using 
RSA-DSS as:
Eds(Cks) → Cksds mod ns = DSig.
The Server S sends the signed cipher-
text of response and session key in the 
form (Crs, Cks, DSig) to the ui.
Server S signs on the leftmost bit of Cks instead 
of the whole message in a bid to increase the 
speed of computation and conserve memory 
space.
3.1.1. Client Registration Phase
Before the communication commences, client 
registers with the server if he/she is a new user 
ui by supplying username, uid on a secure web-
site (https). This phase involves a key gener-
ation module. The server generates public/pri-
vate key pair for each client.
Key Generation Module (KGen). For a new 
user ui, the server S computes public (eui, nui) 
and private key pair (dui, nui). The server keeps 
the public key (eui, nui) in its database so that 
when another user, ui +1 signs up, there will be 
no duplicate public keys which could lead to re-
dundancy. The private key (dui, nui) of each new 
user ui generated by the server is discarded fol-
lowing the registration because the public key 
pair (eui, nui) is known to everyone, but (dui, nui) 
is known only to the owner of the key.
By default, the server generates its own public/
private key pair (es, ns) and (ds, ns) respectively. 
The server keeps its private key (ds, ns) secret 
while the public key (es, ns) is made known to 
everyone.
Client ← Server:
Step 1: Server chooses two large prime num-
bers pui, qui.
Step 2: Server computes the product of pui, qui 
as: nui = pui ∙ qui
Step 3: Server computes ϕ(nui) = (Pui - 1) 
(qui - 1)
Step 4: Server chooses public key e such that 
gcd(e, (nui)) = 1 and 3 ≤ e ≤ ϕ(nui) - 1
Step 5: Server computes private key d as: dui 
= eui-1 mod ϕ(nui).
Step 6: Server sends public/private key pair 
(eui, nui), (dui, nui) to ui.
3.1.2. Client Request Generation Phase
The querying client generates query request in 
relation to client's location coordinates and en-
crypts location-based query request in the form 
(CLui, Cmui, Ckui) to the server by the encryption 
module.
Encryption module. After the user ui has been 
registered and the keys (eui, nui/dui, nui) have 
been generated, he/she can query the LBS serv-
er for POIs by sending a message mui such that 
his/her location is not revealed to unauthorized 
entities. The query content is kept confidential 
and  he/she can verify the authenticity and in-
tegrity of server results. To send the message 
and location coordinates (mui, Lui), ui does the 
following.
(i) The user ui chooses an integer as the ses-
sion key kui to perform message and loca-
tion coordinate transfer.
(ii) ui runs the Client Symmetric Encryption 
(CSE) algorithm. The algorithm allows ui 
to supply the message mui, location coor-
dinates, Lui and session key kui that will be 
used to perform the encryption process.
(iii) ui inputs mui and the location coordinates 
Lui which comprise of latitude as xui and 
longitude as yui represented as Lui = (xui, yui). 
The longitude and latitude indicate the ac-
tual position of the user at the point of que-
rying the location-based server for POIs. 
Therefore, mui, Lui is encrypted with kui as 
Cmui, CLui (ciphertext of the actual message 
and location coordinates respectively) us-
ing the AES-256 algorithm.
(iv) ui then encrypts the session key kui with 
server's public key PKs = (es, ns) by run-
ning the Client Asymmetric Encryption 
(CAE) algorithm. The RSA algorithm is 
used to encrypt session key kui.
The steps are outlined as follows.
Step 1: ui selects an integer as session Key kui.
Step 2: ui encrypts location coordinates Lui = 
(xui, yui) with kui using AES-256 as:
Ekui (Lui) = CLui.
Step 3: ui encrypts the plain text message mui 
with kui using AES-256 as: 
Ekui (mui) = Cmui.
Step 4: ui encrypts key kui using the server's 
public key (es, ns) as:
Ees(kui) → kuies mod ns = Ckui.
The user ui sends encrypted location coordinates, 
message and session key as (CLui, Cmui, Ckui) to 
the server.
54 55A. Onashoga, A. Sodiya and I. Osinuga Privacy Preserving Location-Based Client-Server Service Using Standard Cryptosystem
3.1.3. Server Response Generation Phase
In this phase, server S decrypts the encrypted 
request, searches its database for the POI that 
matches the request, encrypts the response and 
digitally signs with its private key on the left-
most bit of its symmetric key. Server S sends 
(Crs, Cks, DSig) to the client.
The server receives the encrypted signal from 
ui in the form (CLui, Cmui, Ckui). Server runs the 
Server Asymmetric Decryption (SAD) algo-
rithm which accepts (CLui, Cmui, Ckui) and its pri-
vate keys (ds, ns) as the input to retrieve Session 
key kui. The server computes the following:
Decryption module:
Step 1: Server S decrypts Ckui with (ds, ns) to 
give kui as:
Dds(Ckui) → Ckuids mod ns = kui
After the session key has been re-
trieved in plaintext kui, it is used to 
compute the ciphertext location coor-
dinates and message to plaintext Lui, 
mui .
Step 2: Server S runs Server Symmetric De-
cryption (SSD) algorithm on CLui us-
ing AES 256 with the session key kui 
as:
Dkui(CLui) = Lui.
Step 3: Server S runs Server Symmetric De-
cryption (SSD) algorithm on Cmui us-
ing AES 256 with the session key kui 
as:
Dkui(Cmui) = mui.
S searches its plaintext database for a matching 
response (in terms of POIs) to mui. The response 
rs must be related to the location coordinates Lui 
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Key Generation Module (KGen). For a new 
user ui, the server S computes public (eui, nui) 
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Step 2: Server computes the product of pui, qui 
as: nui = pui ∙ qui
Step 3: Server computes ϕ(nui) = (Pui - 1) 
(qui - 1)
Step 4: Server chooses public key e such that 
gcd(e, (nui)) = 1 and 3 ≤ e ≤ ϕ(nui) - 1
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= eui-1 mod ϕ(nui).
Step 6: Server sends public/private key pair 
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Encryption module. After the user ui has been 
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er for POIs by sending a message mui such that 
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entities. The query content is kept confidential 
and  he/she can verify the authenticity and in-
tegrity of server results. To send the message 
and location coordinates (mui, Lui), ui does the 
following.
(i) The user ui chooses an integer as the ses-
sion key kui to perform message and loca-
tion coordinate transfer.
(ii) ui runs the Client Symmetric Encryption 
(CSE) algorithm. The algorithm allows ui 
to supply the message mui, location coor-
dinates, Lui and session key kui that will be 
used to perform the encryption process.
(iii) ui inputs mui and the location coordinates 
Lui which comprise of latitude as xui and 
longitude as yui represented as Lui = (xui, yui). 
The longitude and latitude indicate the ac-
tual position of the user at the point of que-
rying the location-based server for POIs. 
Therefore, mui, Lui is encrypted with kui as 
Cmui, CLui (ciphertext of the actual message 
and location coordinates respectively) us-
ing the AES-256 algorithm.
(iv) ui then encrypts the session key kui with 
server's public key PKs = (es, ns) by run-
ning the Client Asymmetric Encryption 
(CAE) algorithm. The RSA algorithm is 
used to encrypt session key kui.
The steps are outlined as follows.
Step 1: ui selects an integer as session Key kui.
Step 2: ui encrypts location coordinates Lui = 
(xui, yui) with kui using AES-256 as:
Ekui (Lui) = CLui.
Step 3: ui encrypts the plain text message mui 
with kui using AES-256 as: 
Ekui (mui) = Cmui.
Step 4: ui encrypts key kui using the server's 
public key (es, ns) as:
Ees(kui) → kuies mod ns = Ckui.
The user ui sends encrypted location coordinates, 
message and session key as (CLui, Cmui, Ckui) to 
the server.
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3.1.4. Client Response Retrieval Phase
The client verifies if the message is from a gen-
uine server by using the server's public key to 
verify on the encrypted symmetric key. After it 
has verified, it then decrypts.
Verification module. ui verifies DSig with 
(es, ns) as: 








C ' mod n
→
=  →
      (4)
Decryption module. After verification is done, 
the message is decrypted with the client's pri-
vate key.
Step 1: ui decrypts Cks with (dui, nui) to give 
ks as:
Deui(Cks) → Cksdui mod nui = ks
Step 2: ui uses ks to decrypt Crs to get rs as: 
Dks(Crs) = rs.
4. Implementation, Results and  
Evaluation
4.1. Implementation
The proposed scheme was implemented on the 
client-side using Java programming language 
(JDK 1.7) on a 32-bit Windows 7 operating 
system. XML was used to connect Android ap-
plication to the server. The MYSQL database 
provides storage for the user's credentials and 
Point-Of-Interests (POIs). Android Develop-
ment Kit was used to develop Android mobile 
application. The mobile phone used for the 
client during testing is Techno N7 smartphone 
with configuration as Android OS version 4.0.4, 
kernel version 3.0.13 and the baseband version 
MAUI.11AMD .W12.22.SP.VI.P7.
On the server side, PHP was used to interface 
the Android application via the XML, while 
Java was used to develop RSA encryption algo-
rithm. The server configuration is Intel(R) core 
i5, 8 GB RAM, CentOS, HP server. 
The proposed scheme consists of four funda-
mental phases: Client registration phase, Cli-
ent request generation phase, Server response 
generation phase and Client response retrieval 
phase.
4.1.1. Client Registration Phase
The main menu of the proposed scheme has 
three interfaces namely: interface to Find Place, 
Register New User and Suggest Places. The 
new user registers after clicking the ''register 
new user'' button on the HOME page, which 
links to the interface Register Friends. This in-
terface requires users to input their Username 
and Password while the server generates pub-
lic/private key pair for each individual user that 
is being registered.
During the registration at the server side, the 
server awaits incoming request, registers the 
new client details, generates the public and pri-
vate keys, and then sends the details to the user. 
Each interface performs functions on the menu 
list as shown in Figure 2.
4.1.2. Client Request Generation Phase
After the new user has been duly registered, 
the user can request for Point-Of-Interests 
(POIs) from the LBS server. The first thing the 
user does is to login with his/her credentials 
in order to query the location-based service. 
If a user enters incorrect credentials, a prompt 
message that denies access to that user is dis-
played.
After access has been granted to the user, 
an interface showing the category of places 
where user requests for POIs (Points-of-Inter-
ests) services from the LBMS server will be 
displayed. 
As the user chooses a particular POI, the GPS 
enabled on the mobile device acquires location 
coordinates (in terms of longitude and latitude) 
with reference to the user's position. The POIs 
spans 5 km radius around the user's position. 
The interface is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2. LBMS home page
Figure 3. Location coordinates with reference to user's position
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4.1.3. Server Response Generation Phase
The server generates response to the user's re-
quest in relation to proximity of user's position 
by giving ''Suggested Places'' interface (in terms 
of longitude and latitude). 
During the response generation at the server 
side, the server awaits incoming request, de-
crypts the client's request, queries the POI ac-
cording to the proximity, encrypts and signs on 
the response and finally sends the response to 
the user. 
By clicking on one of the Suggested Places (i.e. 
POI), direction is provided on how to locate the 
Suggested Place.
4.1.4. Client Response Retrieval Phase
If a malicious server sends an incorrect result to 
the user, the user verifies the authenticity of the 
result and the origin by using the public key of 
the server. If not, a dialog box pops up indicat-
ing the sender is not genuine.
4.2. Results and Evaluation
In order to evaluate performance of LBS_PI, 
this section provides detailed results of anal-
yses and experiments with existing related re-
searches. 
4.2.1. Security Analysis
Security robustness of the scheme relates to the 
issues of message confidentiality, location and 
identity privacy as well as message and origin 
integrity. Security analysis is evaluated and 
computational and communication overhead of 
the scheme is discussed.
LBS_PI has two aspects of security: message 
confidentiality and message integrity. 
Message confidentiality. Message confiden-
tiality implies the computational infeasibility 
of an adversary to gain access to any useful in-
formation on the content of RSA from which 
session key can be recovered. An adversary 
cannot successfully obtain session key if the 
transaction is intercepted because he/she has to 
derive private key d through which the session 
keys (kui, ks) can be recovered. The adversary 
must be able to solve the integer-factorization 
problem in order to gain access to information 
and this is achieved by factorizing n into prime 
numbers (p and q), provided they are not large 
primes. The secret knowledge of d increases the 
computational hardness of this attack.
User → Server. Assuming that a user ui ∈ U 
(U denotes a set of many users) request for POI 
from the server S, ui has public/private key pair 
eui, dui respectively. By default, S generates its 
public/private key pair as es, ds both asymmet-
ric keys are used for session key transfer. ui 
computes the following.
Step 1: ui selects a session key kui to encrypt 
request p (we assume p to comprise of 
location coordinates (xui, yui) and mes-
sage mui) to compute as:
Ekui(p) = Cp.               (1)
Step 2: ui encrypts kui by computing
Ees(kui) → kuies mod ns = Ckui .    (2)
Note: S decrypts Ckui iff ds = es-1 mod ϕ(ns) as:
Dds(Ckui) → Ckuids mod ns = kui .    (3)
Proof: 
Dds(Ckui) → Ckuids mod ns = kui
Substituting eqn. (2) into (3)
(kuies)ds mod ns = kui
Since (es * ds) mod ϕ(ns) = 1
Therefore kui1 mod ns = kui .
Assuming that an adversary Oscar uj ∈ U' (U' 
denotes a set of attackers) with public/private 
key pair (euj, duj). We show that uj is not a le-
gitimate receiver of the request sent by ui and 
cannot recover the session key kui to decrypt the 
request p. Represented as follows:
Dduj(Ckui) → Ckuiduj mod ns ≠ kui .       (4)
Proof:
Dduj(Ckui) → Ckuiduj mod ns
Substituting eqn. (2) into (4)
(kuies )duj mod ns 
Since (es * duj) mod ϕ(ns) ≠ 1
Therefore (kuies)duj mod ns ≠ kui .
Server → user. Server S responds to ui request 
by computing result r with its session key ks. 
While ks is computed using eui:
Eks(r) = Cr                          (5)
Eeui(ks) → kseui mod nui = Cks          (6)
Authentication: user ui authenticates the result 
from S (Cr, Cks).
ui decrypts Cks as:
Ddui (Cks) → Cksdui mod nui = ks        (7)
NOTE: ui decrypts Cks iff dui = eui-1 mod ϕ(nui)
Proof:
Ddui (Cks) → Cksdui mod nui
Substituting eqn. (6) into (7)
(kseui)dui mod nui
Since (eui * duj) mod ϕ(nui) = 1
ks mod nui = ks
Message integrity. Message integrity means 
that the message has not been modified in tran-
sit, the sender of the message is genuine (data 
origin authentication) and if origin of the mes-
sage is genuine, the message sent from the ori-
gin is correct. Integrity could be achieved using 
the digital signature of the RSA scheme.
After the server S encrypts the result r, S signs 
on the left-most bit of Cks.
Note: Let DS = Digital Signature
S computes DS as:
Eds(Cks)→ Cksds mod ns = DS          (1)
Upon receiving the result from S, ui computes 
the following:
Des (DS) → DSes mod ns = Cks        (2)
Substituting eqn. (1) into (2)
(Cksds)es mod ns
Since (es * ds) mod ϕ(ns) = 1
Therefore Cks1 mod ns = Cks
Assume a malicious server Sm (with private/
public key pair dj, ej) sends a compromised re-
sult to ui. As long as the session key ks cannot be 
recovered by Sm, it implies ks cannot be known 
which further ascertains that the result cannot 
be altered while in transit and the user verifies 
the genuineness of server's result.
Sm signs with dj as:
Edj(Cks) → Cksdj mod nj ≠ DS          (3)
ui to verify as:
Des (DS) → DSes mod nj ≠ Cks .        (4)
Proof:
Des (DS) → DSes mod nj ≠ Cks
Substituting eqn. (3) into (4)
Des (DS) → (Cks dj)es mod nj 
Since (dj * es) mod ϕ(nj) ≠ 1
Therefore Cks mod nj ≠ Cks
4.2.2. Performance Comparison
Performance of the developed LBS_PI was 
measured based on known and benchmarked 
metrics as response time and throughput. Re-
sponse time is the measurement of the com-
putation time (in seconds) needed for user and 
server to encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify re-
quest and response as required, while through-
put is the number of responses the server can 
process per time unit.
Experimental results show the practical perfor-
mance of the LBS_PI when benchmarked with 
Oblivious Transfer and Private Information Re-
trieval of Paulet et al. [24] and Privacy Statis-
tics of Popa et al. [27] based on the response 
time and throughput respectively.
Table 1. Request generation.
Method Response time
LBS_PI 5.801 s
Paulet et al. (2014) 23.907 s
In Table 1, at request generation, the average 
response time when the user request for POIs 
and when his/her location coordinates appears 
on the mobile device (client-side) was 5.801 s 
as compared to 23.907 s of Paulet et al. [24]. 
Similarly, in Table 2, at response generation, the 
average response time when the server receives 
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requests from the user, searches for correspond-
ing response and sends response to the user was 
4.571 s as compared to 1.75 s of Paulet et al. 
[24].
Table 2. Response generation.
Method Response time
LBS_PI 4.571 s
Paulet et al. (2014) 1.75 s
At response retrieval, Table 3 shows the aver-
age response time when the user verifies and 
decrypts was 0.491 s compared to 0.112 s ob-
tained by Paulet et al. [24] whose work entailed 
only decryption and not verification.
Table 3. Response retrieval.
Method Response time
LBS_PI 0.491 s
Paulet et al. (2014) 0.112 s




LBS_PI 1.6 s 3.2 s 6.4 s
Popa et al. (2011) 1.55 s 3.19 s 6.3 s
As depicted in Table 4, the average time taken 
by the server to generate response in LBS_PI 
when it involves one request is 1.6 s, for two 
requests the time consumption is doubled com-
pared to the previous request. As the request in-
creases to three, the change in processing time 
slightly increases with the same change in time. 
When benchmarked with Popa et al. [27], the 
processing time is slightly faster in LBS_PI, al-
though the change in the time is very close.
On the storage aspect, users only store their user 
id (i.e., username) and private key as their main 
credentials. Therefore, much storage space is 
not consumed by the proposed scheme on the 
user/client side.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Providing confidentiality and integrity for com-
munication that occurs between users and lo-
cation service providers is a crucial issue. In 
this paper, a practical encryption scheme that 
secures message, location and key transfer is 
discussed. The scheme is secure, practical, sim-
ple and easy to realize. The scheme achieves 
efficiency in both computational and commu-
nication areas while enhancing integrity, con-
fidentiality, non-repudiation and also achieving 
a good compromise between quality of service 
and response time on the clients' mobile devic-
es.
The Location-Based Service for enhancing Pri-
vacy and Integrity (LBS_PI) was designed to 
address the problem of privacy and integrity. 
LBS_PI was tested on 8 POIs (Points-Of-Inter-
ests) spanning 5 km radius around users' posi-
tion. A detailed security analysis demonstrating 
the resistance of LBS_PI to a range of suscepti-
ble attacks was provided.
The performance of LBS_PI, when com-
pared with related work, showed that LBS_PI 
could actually guarantee privacy and integrity 
with faster average response time and higher 
throughput in Location-Based Mobile Services.
This paper addresses two crucial issues in pri-
vacy preservation of LBMS: message confiden-
tiality and integrity of server's response. The 
scheme increases complexity common modu-
lus attack, integer factorization attack as well 
as brute force attack. Future work will entail a 
scheme that can handle multiple users simul-
taneously along with congestion by initiating 
scheduling mechanism.
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Table 3. Response retrieval.
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LBS_PI 1.6 s 3.2 s 6.4 s
Popa et al. (2011) 1.55 s 3.19 s 6.3 s
As depicted in Table 4, the average time taken 
by the server to generate response in LBS_PI 
when it involves one request is 1.6 s, for two 
requests the time consumption is doubled com-
pared to the previous request. As the request in-
creases to three, the change in processing time 
slightly increases with the same change in time. 
When benchmarked with Popa et al. [27], the 
processing time is slightly faster in LBS_PI, al-
though the change in the time is very close.
On the storage aspect, users only store their user 
id (i.e., username) and private key as their main 
credentials. Therefore, much storage space is 
not consumed by the proposed scheme on the 
user/client side.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Providing confidentiality and integrity for com-
munication that occurs between users and lo-
cation service providers is a crucial issue. In 
this paper, a practical encryption scheme that 
secures message, location and key transfer is 
discussed. The scheme is secure, practical, sim-
ple and easy to realize. The scheme achieves 
efficiency in both computational and commu-
nication areas while enhancing integrity, con-
fidentiality, non-repudiation and also achieving 
a good compromise between quality of service 
and response time on the clients' mobile devic-
es.
The Location-Based Service for enhancing Pri-
vacy and Integrity (LBS_PI) was designed to 
address the problem of privacy and integrity. 
LBS_PI was tested on 8 POIs (Points-Of-Inter-
ests) spanning 5 km radius around users' posi-
tion. A detailed security analysis demonstrating 
the resistance of LBS_PI to a range of suscepti-
ble attacks was provided.
The performance of LBS_PI, when com-
pared with related work, showed that LBS_PI 
could actually guarantee privacy and integrity 
with faster average response time and higher 
throughput in Location-Based Mobile Services.
This paper addresses two crucial issues in pri-
vacy preservation of LBMS: message confiden-
tiality and integrity of server's response. The 
scheme increases complexity common modu-
lus attack, integer factorization attack as well 
as brute force attack. Future work will entail a 
scheme that can handle multiple users simul-
taneously along with congestion by initiating 
scheduling mechanism.
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